This paper explores the possibilities of implementing a tradable permit program in private road transport, which includes an active involvement of the households and the transport industry. At present, there are no examples of allocation of permits to households. Although the permit system does not reduce emissions or congestion as such, it provides a direct incentive to achieve a fixed level of road externalities, at the lowest cost and assuring flexibility amongst the market players. The permit holder can be the vehicle user, owner or producer, while the facility can vary from vehicle ownership, fuel, vehicle kilometres, and access to a city or a main road during a certain time-period. We discuss seven different permit schemes by describing their threshold issues, which include the definition of the basic purpose of the system, geographic area to be covered and the nature of the commodity to be traded. Furthermore, we discuss their design issues, comprising the allocation of initial allowances, the geographic or temporal flexibility or restrictions, the establishment of institutions. Thirdly, we consider the implementation issues of the different systems. Finally, the Bohm and Russel-criteria (1985) are used to assess the different schemes: information intensity, efficiency, ease of monitoring and enforcement,flexibility in the face of economic change, dynamic incentives and political considerations.in: Proceedings WCTR Conference, Istanbul, 25 p.